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EXTRATERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.
lIT v. Vencap, Ltd.
Unusually complex jurisdictional issues arise when a securities
transaction involves conduct in several countries, foreign purchas-
ers or sellers, or the securities of issuers not incorporated in the
United States.' In determining whether a given transaction falls
within the intended scope of federal securities law,2 courts have
focused upon the transaction's relation to American investors,
domestic securities markets, and interstate commerce, 3 thereby
narrowing the inquiry traditionally allowed by general principles of
international jurisdiction.4 Accordingly, among the factors consid-
I For discussions of cases involving extraterritorial application of securities law, see 3 A.
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD: SEC RULE lOb-5 § 11.2(570), at 246.11 (1974); Mizrack,
Recent Deuelopments in the Extratenitorial Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities and [sic] Ex-
change Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAw. 367 (1975); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (1969); Note, American Adjudication of Trans-
national Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976) [hereinafter cited as American Ad-
judication]; Comment, The Transational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1973).2 The early approach of American courts was to presume that laws had no extraterrito-
rial application absent dear congressional intent to the contrary. American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). Under more modern principles, however, a
court's finding that the consequences of extraterritorial conduct fall within the intended
scope of the congressional regulation in question is sufficient to rebut such a presumption.
See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (Lanham Trade-Mark Act of
1946); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972)
(securities law); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Center, Inc., 1963 Trade
Cas. 77,414, 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y.) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
" The purpose of federal securities law is to regulate transactions "affected with a
national public interest" in order to provide fair and honest markets and protect interstate
commerce. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970), as amended, (Supp.
IV, 1974). When confronted with alleged extraterritorial violations of securities law, courts
will therefore search for a relationship between the transaction and American stock ex-
changes, interstate commerce, or American investors.
In Investment Props. Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 93,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court refused to take jurisdiction over a claim,
brought by a foreign corporation against its parent, arising out of a transaction which was
substantially foreign and had no domestic impact. Although there were some American
shareholders in the plaintiff corporation, none came forward to allege any injury. Id. at
90,726. See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-17 (1974), in which a
narrowly divided Court held that an arbitration clause in a contract negotiated in foreign
countries, and concerning the sale of business enterprises whose activities were directed to
foreign commercial markets, precluded application of federal securities law.
4 The foundation of a nation's jurisdiction is its sovereign power to prescribe rules of
conduct within its territory, no matter where the effects of such conduct occur. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. A nation may similarly regulate conduct beyond its
borders when such conduct has direct and foreseeable consequences within its territory. Id.
§ 18(b)(ii). Jurisdiction also extends to the conduct of a country's nationals anywhere in the
world. Id. § 30. Based upon this principle, the acts or conduct of foreign corporations owned
or controlled by American nationals may be regulated by the United States. Id. § 27,
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ered are the nationality of the plaintiff,5 the losses allegedly suf-
fered by American investors, 6 the nature of the specific conduct
within the United States,7 and whether the stock is registered on a
domestic securities exchange. s
In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.9 and HT v. Vencap, Ltd.10 the
Second Circuit considered the evolving prerequisites for subject
matter jurisdiction in actions arising out of substantially foreign
transactions." The principal significance of these decisions lies in
comment d. In the absence of explicit congressional direction, these notions define the outer
limits of a federal statute's extraterritorial application. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
In some instances, however, the judiciary has refused to apply congressional regulation
to the fullest extent permitted by international law. The Second Circuit, in particular, has
exercised such restraint with respect to federal securities law. See, e.g., id., wherein the then
Chief Judge Friendly noted that
the language of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is much too inconclusive to
lead us to believe that Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct through-
out the world in every instance where an American company bought or sold a
security.
Id. at 1334. Thus, a mere finding that the seller is an American national, or that an
American purchaser has been adversely affected, will not automatically bring the transaction
within the ambit of federal securities law. See also Investment Props. Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd.,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
5 See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972). When securities actions seeking damages have been initiated by resident American
plaintiffs, courts have had comparatively little difficulty in finding a sufficient connection
with the intended scope of federal securities law. In actions by foreign citizens or corpora-
tions, however, courts have generally demanded a more substantial nexus with the interests
of the United States. Compare Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973)
with Investment Props. Int'l, Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
T 93,011, at 90,735 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).6 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). In Schoenbaum, a
stockholder's derivative action brought by an American plaintiff, the court extended jurisdic-
tion to a claim arising out of a securities transaction between two Canadian corporations, one
of which had shares traded on the American Stock Exchange. The impairment of American
shareholders' equity in domestically registered stock, caused by fraudulent foreign transac-
tions, was held to have a sufficiently serious and foreseeable effect on United States com-
merce to warrant the court's assumption of jurisdiction. But see Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972), where the court suggested that
mere losses by American investors, without conduct, registration, purchase, or sale in the
United States, would not bring the transaction within the scope of federal securities law.
'See, e.g., Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 591, 599 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (jurisdiction based
on three securities transactions occurring in Florida which were part of overall scheme to
deplete foreign bank's assets); Wandschneider v. Industrial Incomes, Inc., of North
America, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,422 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)(jurisdiction based on domestic conduct consisting of devising fraudulent scheme and pre-
paring fraudulent prospectus for sale abroad).
'See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206, rev'd on rehearing on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Madonick v.
Denison Mines Ltd., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,550 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
9 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 453 (1975).
0 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
" No precise definition can be given which will clearly differentiate between a substan-
tially domestic and substantially foreign transaction. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
418
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the development therein of distinct standards - determined by the
nationality and residence of the plaintiff - to be utilized in evaluat-
ing the nature and degree of domestic conduct required as a
predicate for subject matter jurisdiction.' 2 More particularly, the
Second Circuit held that a foreign plaintiff must demonstrate that
his losses were "directly caused" by fraudulent conduct within the
United States. 13 In contrast, an American plaintiff may invoke the
court's jurisdiction "whether or not [conduct] of material impor-
tance occurred in this country . .".". For Americans residing
abroad, the court, imposing an intermediate standard, ruled that
such nonresidents must show that domestic conduct "significantly
contributed" to their losses.' 5
The Bersch action was brought by an American plaintiff on
behalf of a class of predominantly foreign investors' 6 and sought
damages against a foreign corporation 7 and its underwriters 8 and
U.S. 506 (1974), the Supreme Court described the contract in question as a "truly interna-
tional agreement" since it had been negotiated in several countries (including the United
States) and was concerned with the purchase of a business enterprise directed at foreign
commercial markets. Id. at 515. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Douglas described "the
international aura" which the Court gave the contract as "ominous," id. at 533 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), and voiced the fear that the Court was denying protection to investors in
multinational corporations with global spheres of operation. When "sufficient [domestic]
contacts" exist, Justice Douglas continued, our securities laws should be applied. Id. at 534.
Although Scherk is the only Surpeme Court case to deal with the extraterritorial reach of
federal securities law, its application may be quite limited since the purchase contract there
involved contained an agreement to arbitrate any disputes before the International Chamber
of Commerce in Paris. Notably absent from both the Bersch and IT opinions was any
mention of the Scherk decision.
12 519 F.2d at 993; id. at 1018.
13 1d. at 993; accord, id. at 1018. The presence of significant American shareholder
participation in a foreign corporate plaintiff will usually be persuasive in a court's evaluation
of the jurisdictional question. Compare Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 591, 599 (M.D. Fla.
1974) (court assumed jurisdiction where 50% of all corporate investment generated by
American residents) with IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016-17 (2d Cir. 1975) (0.2%
American shareholder participation did not constitute sufficient impact upon American
interests to warrant court's assumption of jurisdiction).
'
4 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993. While the exact nature of the domestic conduct, if any, which
will be required by the Second Circuit where American residents are plaintiffs is unclear, it is
unlikely that the court intended to permit the assumption of jurisdiction based solely on the
fact that the plaintiff is a resident. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468
F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), quoted in note 4 supra. In any case, other considerations such as the
registration of the securities, the foreseeability of the plaintiff's losses, and the nationality of
the defendant will presumably still be relevant.
15Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993. Clearly, more of a demonstration that the transaction was
involved with the domestic community will be required of nonresident than of resident
American plaintiffs.
10 The vast majority of the sales in question in Bersch were made to citizens of Canada,
Australia, England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and other countries in Europe, Asia,
Africa, and South America. Id. at 978.
17 The defendant foreign corporation was I.O.S., Ltd. (1OS), the issuer of the securities
involved in the challenged transactions. Drexel Firestone, Inc., the first-named defendant,
was one of the corporation's underwriters.
" Six banking houses, known as the "Drexel Group," underwrote one of three related
1975]
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accountants.1 9 Defendants had been involved in three related in-
ternational public offerings2 0 of stock in I.O.S., Ltd. (IOS).21
Whereas the defendants' conduct within this country was prepara-
tory in nature and concerned the initial organization and coordina-
tion of the offerings,22 the vast majority of sales and misrepresenta-
tions were made outside the territorial boundaries of the United
States. 3 Although the offerings were not directed to the United
States investment public, 2 4 and of the estimated class of purchasers
of 50,000, only 386 were Americans, 25 plaintiff alleged that defen-
public offerings of lOS. See note 20 infra. Of the six banks, two were American and four
were European. Subsidiaries of two of the European banks maintained offices in New York
City, although both banks contended that their subsidiaries were in no way involved in the
IOS offering. 519 F.2d at 979-80 n.9. The other two offerings of IOS were underwritten
individually, one by a Canadian investment house and the other by a Bahamian bank, a
subsidiary of IOS. Id. at 980.
The action against the Canadian underwriter was dismissed for lack of in personam
jurisdiction. Id. at 998-1000. The court held that: (1) the underwriter lacked sufficient
contacts with the United States to be considered "doing business" here; (2) its acts in the
United States with regard to the IOS underwriting, two short meetings in which no decisions
were made, were insufficient to confer jurisdiction; and (3) its connection with the two other
offerings in which the American plaintiffs purchased their stock was insufficient to be
considered a cause of the plaintiffs' losses. Id.
'9 The accountants were described as "an international accounting firm with its principal
office in the United States." Id. at 980. In failing to discuss the relevance of the American
citizenship of some of the accountants and underwriters, the court impliedly rejected the
concept of a defendant's nationality as a basis for extending the subject matter jurisdiction of
securities law. See note 4 supra. But cf. Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp..1345, 1347
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla.
1963), wherein both district courts, in deciding the jurisdictional question, placed some
emphasis on determining the true nationality of the defendants by piercing the corporate
veil.
20 The three offerings were made at approximately the same time and at the same price,
$10 per share. Although the Canadian prospectus differed insofar as was necessary to
comply with Canadian regulations, the three prospectuses were substantially identical; all
three contained the IOS balance sheet and a report prepared by the defendant accountant.
519 F.2d at 980. The three underwritings were initially successful in that they were fully
subscribed. Trading stabilized briefly at $14 per share, but after several weeks collapsed
below the $10 level. Three weeks later the stock was unsaleable. Id. at 981.
2 IOS was an international financial service company, organized under Canadian law
with its main office in Geneva, which controlled and managed a subsidiary complex of
mutual funds. Prior to the public offerings, the stock of IOS and its subsidiaries was owned
by its organizer, Bernard Cornfeld, also a defendant, and his employees. Id. at 978. Follow-
ing the collapse, control of IOS passed into the hands of Robert L. Vesco, who, at the time of
trial, was, as the court noted, "currently a resident of Costa Rica, and a defendant in a
substantial number of actions for fraud pending in this circuit." Id. at 981. IOS is now in the
hands of Canadian liquidators who are proceeding with the liquidation of IOS with the
assistance of informal representatives of governments and regulatory agencies having au-
thority over its interconnected subsidiaries. Id. at 978 n.4. For journalistic accounts of the
IOS story see R. HUTCHISON, VESCO (1974); Bus. WEEK, Mar. 30, 1974, at 78-80; Bus. WEEK,
July 7, 1973, at 32; NEWSWEEK, Dec. 11, 1972, at 85-86.
22 519 F.2d at 985 n.24.23 Id. at 980.
24 Id.
25 Bersch brought the action in the name of all purchasers, foreign and domestic. Id. at
977-78 n.2.
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dants were subject to, and had in fact violated, the antifraud provi-
sions of the Securities Act of 193326 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.27 The Second Circuit acknowledged its jurisdiction
over the claims of the American plaintiffs, 28 but eliminated all
foreign members from the class action on the ground that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over their claims.2 9
The HT case was initiated by the liquidators of I1T, 30 an
offshore mutual fund with, at most, 0.5 percent American invest-
ment participation, 31 to recoup a $3 million loss resulting from
IT's investment in Vencap, Ltd., a Bahamian corporation.3 2 Plain-
tiff alleged that Vencap's founder, Richard Pistell, had defrauded
IT in the initial investment agreement,33 had improperly con-
verted $600,000 of Vencap funds to his own use,34 and had wasted
a substantial portion of Vencap's funds by investing approximately
a third of its capital in other corporations under his control .3
Although the oral agreement between Pistell and IT was reached
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970).
27 Id. §§ 78a et seq., as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). While the court, in its opinion, did not
specify which provisions of the securities Acts were allegedly violated, the complaint alleged
that the underwriters misrepresented to the public that IOS was suitable for public owner-
ship when they knew it was not, that the prospectuses failed to disclose illegal activities which
had damaged 10S, that the books of IOS were in a chaotic condition, that the officers had
"touted" the company's prospects, and that the accountant had not observed generally
accepted accounting principles in preparing the financial statement. 519 F.2d at 981.
20 519 F.2d at 1001.
29 1d.
30 When the action was commenced, IIT, part of the lOS complex, was in the process of
liquidation in Luxembourg. id. at 1003. The liquidators' claim against Vencap was presum-
ably for the benefit of IIT's creditors and shareholders.311d. at 1016.
321d. at 1005.
33 Id. at 1011-14. The agreement was decidedly favorable to Vencap. In return for its $3
million investment, which would supply 99.9% of Vencap's capital, lIT received no vote at
meetings of stockholders, no representation on the board of directors, and no current
income unless declared by the board. The board, moreover, was to be elected solely by the
common stockholders who had invested only $4000. Pistell, who had invested $2000, was
president, chairman, and treasurer. In the event dividends were declared, lIT would receive
a 6% noncumulative dividend plus a third of the earnings above that dividend, and the
common shareholders, who had invested .1% of the capital, would receive two-thirds of the
remaining earnings. Id. at 1011. Because the conditions were clearly disclosed to lIT, a
sophisticated investor, the court held that such an agreement was not fraudulent. Id.
34 Although there was conflicting evidence regarding the mechanics of Pistelrs conver-
sion, he succeeded in funneling $600,000 of Vencap's investment capital, through another
corporation which he controlled, into his own hands for the payment of income and
property taxes, several bank loans, and a judgment against him. Vencap received only 7%
interest and a small stock option in return. Id. at 1008-09. In connection with his employ-
ment with Vencap, Pistell received, in addition to his annual salary, a home in the Bahamas
worth $150,000, payments amounting to $10,000 for alimony to his ex-wife, and $2000 for
the telephone bills of his present wife. Id. at 1009 & n.14.
35Id. at 1010. The liT court noted that at the time of the hearing one of Pistell's
investments in corporations under his control had an unrealized loss of approximately
$340,000. Id. at 1010 & n.16.
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abroad,36 and the confirmatory memorandum was prepared in
the Bahamas, at least part of the stock purchase agreement was
drafted by 1IT's attorneys in New York.3 7 Moreover, Vencap's
business, including the alleged misuse of funds, was managed from
a New York law office.3 8 Since the fraudulent diversion of assets
had taken place in the United States, the court here, in contrast to
Bersch, extended jurisdiction to the foreign plaintiff.3 9
In reaching its holdings in Bersch and HT, the court first
analyzed the effects within the United States of the various transac-
tions in question to determine whether these effects might serve as
a basis for jurisdiction under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 40 The court
examined a previous decision of the Second Circuit, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,4' wherein it was held that the impairment of American
shareholder equity produced a sufficiently serious and foreseeable
effect on United States commerce to warrant the assumption of
jurisdiction over claims of all investors, both foreign and domes-
tic. 42 Applying this principle to the HT case, the court determined
that the effects on American economic interests were unsubstantial,
since at most 0.2 percent of IIT's fundholders were American
citizens whose contributions represented no more than 0.5 percent
of the firm's total investment capital,43 and concluded that adverse
economic effects alone did not support a finding of subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims asserted by the foreign liquidators of
IIT.44 In Bersch, however, the investment losses of the American
members of the plaintiff class were considered sufficient to warrant
3 Id. at 1005. Although the precise location of the oral agreement between liT and
Pistell was not ascertained by the court, no party contended that it had taken place in the
United States. Id. at 1005 n.5.31Id. at 1006. Much of the evidence indicated that the substance of the purchase
agreement was prepared in the Bahamas. No conclusive determination of this fact was
possible from the record, however, since none of IT's lawyers had testified in the district
court. Id.
38 "The [district] court found that '[1literally hundreds of transactions and pieces of mail
for Vencap . . . were initiated, directed and consummated from [the New York office of
Vencap's lawyers]' ...."Id. at 1018.
39 The HT court stated:
Our ruling on this basis of jurisdiction is limited to the perpetration of fraudulent
acts themselves and does not extend to mere preparatory activities or the failure to
prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in foreign
countries such as in Bersch.
Id.
4 0 Bersch, id. at 987-90; HT, id. at 1016-17.
41 405 F.2d 200, rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), discussed in note 6 supra.
42 405 F.2d at 208-09.
43 519 F.2d at 1016-17.
44 Id. at 1017. The HT court did, however, recognize the existence of jurisdiction based
on other grounds. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
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the exercise of jurisdiction over their individual claims. 45 Neverthe-
less, the court was unwilling to use the effects on a small number of
Americans as a basis for extending jurisdiction to the claims of the
50,000 foreign members of that class. 46
The plaintiffs in Bersch had also alleged that the collapse of the
IOS public offering had general adverse effects within the United
States,47 including destruction of investor confidence, decrease of
foreign investment, and the consequent upset of America's balance
of payments.48 While the court did not doubt the negative impact
of the IOS collapse on the domestic economy, it concluded that
such generalized effects would not sustain a finding of subject
matter jurisdiction over a federal securities law damage suit
brought by foreigners. 49 Although the generalized effects argu-
ment finds some support in section 2 of. the 1934 Act, which
provides for regulation necessary to protect the "national public
interest,"50 the court's requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a
more specific domestic injury in a private suit for damages appears
to be the stronger approach. As the Bersch court noted, there may
be agreements beyond the nation's borders which, although not
intended to have any domestic impact, have definite economic
repercussions here.51 Attempts by Congress to regulate all such
international transactions would go beyond the principles of inter-
national justice.52
45 519 F.2d at 989, 993.
46d. at 996.
471d. at 987-89. Plaintiffs in Bersch relied upon an affidavit of a professor at the
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania to support the
allegation of general adverse effects.
48Id.
49 As the Bersch court noted, activity outside the boundaries of the United States
does not support subject matter jurisdiction if there was no intention that the
securities should be offered to anyone in the United States, simply because in the
long run there was an adverse effect on this country's general economic interests or
on American security prices.
Id. at 989.
50 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
"' 519 F.2d at 989 n.33.
52 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), supra note 4, § 18(b)(iii) provides that only effects which are
direct and foreseeable may serve as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. The Bersch court
expressed concern over the international complications which could result from a contrary
finding. 519 F.2d at 989 n.33. In addition, the court observed that the antifraud provisions
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts refer to acts in connection with the "offer or sale," Securities Act
of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), or "purchase or sale," Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), of any security. This led the court to conclude that,
as opposed to general adverse effects, there must be an injury to a purchaser or seller in
whom the United States has a protective interest. 519 F.2d at 989. Regarding an analogous
situation concerning the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946,
theBersch court noted that in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), the use of the
Bulova name on watches assembled in Mexico was deemed an actionable violation because it
had a direct and foreseeable effect on Bulova's watch business in Texas and not because it
gave the American watch business a "bad name." 519 F.2d at 989 n.35.
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Were this the extent of the Second Circuit's analysis, the
foreign plaintiffs in both Bersch and 1IT would have been pre-
cluded from obtaining the protection of American securities law.
The panel was convinced, however, that Congress never intended
"to allow the United States to be used as a base for manufacturing
fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are ped-
dled only to foreigners. ' 53 Hence, the court considered, as an
alternative jurisdictional nexus, the nature of the defendants'
domestic conduct. It reasoned that foreign plaintiffs, 54 not being
within the explicit framework of the statutes' protection,55 must be
able to show that conduct occurring within the United States was
the direct cause of their injury. 56 In the case of nonresident Ameri-
can plaintiffs, however, mere preparatory conduct was held to be a
sufficient jurisdictional predicate as long as it substantially contrib-
uted to their losses. 57 While the standards enunciated by the court
appear to draw a workable distinction between the types of conduct
required in cases involving nonresident American plaintiffs and
those involving foreign plaintiffs, they may be difficult to apply or
to justify when the preparatory conduct is indispensable to the
consummation of the entire transaction. 58
Both HT and Bersch contained exanaples of what the Second
Circuit categorized as preparatory conduct. In Bersch, representa-
tives of IOS met in New York with its underwriters, legal represen-
tatives, and accountants on numerous occasions to initiate and
structure the offerings. 59 Other preparatory conduct, also in New
York, included a meeting between the underwriters and the Se-
curities Exchange Commission, preliminary discussions concerning
underwriting commissions, and the performance of various ac-
counting functions. Moreover, sections of the prospectus were
53 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 1017.
5' Presumably, the court did not intend to draw a distinction between Americans and
foreigners in the domestic setting since domestic distinctions based on alienage are constitu-
tionally suspect. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). One commentator asserts
that even in the international setting such a distinction cannot be harmonized with American
treaty commitments or international legal norms. American Adjudication, supra note 1, at 569
& nn.95 & 96.
5 While the court acknowledged that Congress did not expressly consider the extrater-
ritorial application of the securities Acts, see text accompanying note 85 infra, the court
construed the purchaser-seller requirements in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to encompass only
those parties "in whom the United States has an interest . Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989.
56 519 F.2d at 992-93; liT, id. at 1018.5 t Bersch, id. at 993.
-8 The difficulty in application of the Second Circuit's test has indeed already been
suggested by one student author. See American Adjudication, supra note 1, at 570-71.
9 519 F.2d at 985 n.24.
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drafted in New York and conveyed via telephone to Geneva.6" In
HT, the domestic preparatory conduct consisted primarily of draft-
ing portions of a purchase contract which had been orally agreed
upon in London and was eventually signed in the Bahamas. 6' It
would appear that the domestic preparatory activity in Bersch had
far greater qualitative and quantitative impact upon the entire
transaction than the domestic preparatory activity in 1IT. Whereas
the domestic preparatory conduct in HT was essentially the draft-
ing of a written agreement which had been fully negotiated
elsewhere, the domestic preparatory conduct in Bersch involved
organizational activity without which the transaction may never
have occurred. Thus, even the factual circumstances considered by
the Second Circuit suggest that the preparatory activity, itself, may,
or may not, be directly causative.
Other decisions, apparently mindful of the factual complexity
present in multinational securities cases, have avoided the estab-
lishment of so rigid a distinction between causative and prepara-
tory acts. In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 62 an
earlier Second Circuit decision, the court held the question of
where the "critical misrepresentations" 63 took place not to be deci-
sive since it was "impossible to say that conduct in the United States
was not 'an essential link' . . . in inducing Leasco to make the
open-market purchases ....64 Similarly, in SEC v. United Financial
Group, Inc.,65 the Ninth Circuit relied upon the "substantial ac-
tivities ... carried on by [the defendants] in the United States in
order to facilitate the sales of securities abroad"66 to sustain its
60 Id. Some courts would take the position that the transmission to Geneva, by tele-
phone, of portions of a fraudulent prospectus, a clear use of an instrumentality of interstate
commerce, should be held an actionable violation of the 1934 Act regardless of the national-
ity of the plaintiff. See SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla.
1963), discussed in notes 68-69 and accompanying text infra.
61 519 F.2d at 1005-07.
62 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
6Id. at 1334.
41d. at 1335 (citation omitted). Initial misrepresentations were made in the United
States to Leasco, a domestic corporation, in the course of attempts to form a joint venture
which never materialized. More extensive negotiation concerning a tender offer, as well as
the eventual open market purchase, took place in London. Although the court expressed
doubt about extending jurisdiction where no fraud had been "practiced" in the United States,
id. at 1334, its analysis suggests a broader approach. See id. at 1335.
65 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 358. The defendants' domestic conduct consisted of the management and
control of offshore mutual funds through a domestic corporation and the use of the mails to
facilitate sales of the funds. The court was not persuaded by the defendants' argument that
jurisdiction should be declined because of the small number of American investors involved.
Id. at 356-57.
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finding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction.67 And, in
SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp.,68 a Florida district court
said in dicta that any scheme which employed the mails or other
interstate facilities, directly or indirectly, would be within the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the court.6 9
Another approach to the jurisdictional question, which has
been adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Proposed
Federal Securities Code,7 0 is to examine whether the domestic
conduct is a "substantial constituent element" of the entire transac-
tion.7 ' Section 1604(a)(1)(D)(i) of the proposed code would extend
jurisdiction to extraterritorial transactions "whose constituent ele-
ments occur to a substantial (but not necessarily predominant)
extent within the United States. ' 72 Of course, the "substantial con-
stituent elements" test is not without its own definitional problems.
The ALI never fully defines "substantial constituent elements." It is
pointed out in a note to the section, however, that constituent
elements are "not limited to acts essential to the establishment of
the prohibited, required or actionable conduct. '7 3 Presumably
6 Id. at 358.
68 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). In Gulf Intercontinental the SEC sought, inter alia, an
injunction against Florida citizens who had created a Canadian corporation in order to raise
money by the issuance of notes advertised in Canadian newspapers.691 Id. at 995. The Gulf Intercontinental court based jurisdiction on the filtering back of
Canadian newspaper advertisements to the United States notwithstanding the fact that no
showing was made of any reliance on, or acceptance of, the offers. Id. at 994-95. The "use of
interstate commerce facilities" theory encompassed by rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1975), and to which the court referred in dicta, is based upon the plenary power of
Congress to keep interstate commerce free from fraud, however incidental the use, and is
generally recognized as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over claims arising from domestic
transactions which are clearly within the scope of the Acts. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW
FRAUD: SEC RULE lOb-5 § 11.2, at 245 (1974). The Florida district court, however, also noted
that there was "nothing within the Acts in question which would appear to limit the
protection offered by [the antifraud provisions] to residents of the United States." 223 F.
Supp. at 995.
Other courts have been reluctant to reach such a sweeping conclusion where foreign
transactions and purchasers are involved. See, e.g., SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474
F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1973). This reluctance may flow from the fact that such transactions
are not clearly within the Acts' intended scope. The Second Circuit, rejecting the type of
approach suggested in Gulf Intercontinental, has answered the jurisdictional question with a
two-step analysis. The court will first inquire whether there is subject matter jurisdiction over
the transaction and then look into whether there has been sufficient use of interstate
commerce to trigger application of the antifraud provisions. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200, 210 (2d Cir. 1968).
70 ALI PROPOSED FED. SECURITIES CODE (Reporter's Revisions of Text of Tent. Drafts
Nos. 1-3, 1974) [hereinafter cited as ALI CODE]. Of course, the ALl proposal focuses on its
view of what the law should be. But on a question such as this, devoid of real congressional
consideration, the courts might be wise to give strong weight to the opinion of the Institute,
since it has considered the problem in depth.
71Id. § 1604(a)(1)(D)(i).
72Id.
13 Id., note at 233.
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then, the fact that the misrepresentation and reliance, essential
elements of a traditional fraud action,74 took place outside the
United States would not be decisive where a substantial number of
conceivably "constituent elements," such as organizational meetings
and the preparation of prospectuses and the financial statements
contained therein, took place within the jurisdiction.7 5 A determi-
nation that there was a jurisdictional nexus to support the claims of
the foreign plaintiffs in Bersch might therefore be possible under
the ALI test even though the prospectus emanated from foreign
countries and the bulk of activities occurred abroad. Finding that
the preparatory acts there involved constituted a "substantial" por-
tion of the constituent elements might still be problematic, how-
ever, in view of the Bersch court's observation that foreign conduct
outweighed the domestic preparatory activity.
76
Equally troublesome to the Second Circuit was the procedural
posture of the foreign purchasers' claims in Bersch. Presentation of
the claims through the use of the class action device7 7 created a
serious problem, in the court's opinion, because of "the dubious
binding effect of a defendants' judgment (or a possibly inadequate
plaintiff's judgment) on absent foreign plaintiffs . ... ,,7 An at-
tempt by either party to obtain recognition of the Bersch judgment
as a final adjudication on the merits in any subsequent foreign
litigation could open a Pandora's box of jurisdictional attacks. As
11 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965). In a securities fraud, a misrepresentation may take several forms, including, but not
limited to, the distribution of a deceptive prospectus. The. actual purchase of securities made
in response to information contained in the prospectus constitutes the reliance element of the
fraud.
' Cf. ALI CODE, supra note 70, § 1604(a)(2), which states, in part, that offers to buy or
sell extended outside the United States would be actionable if initiated in the United States.
76 519 F.2d at 987.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Before a plaintiff can maintain the type of class action employed in
Bersch, the court must find that such an action is "superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Id. 23(b)(3). See also CLass AcTIONS
§§ 2.62-.70 (Ill. Inst. for C.L.E., 1974). The Bersch court noted that 395 claimants of 22
nationalities, including 18 Americans, had intervened in a Swiss proceeding against Bernard
Cornfeld, the founder of IOS, for damages resulting from their purchases. 519 F.2d at 997
n.49. Furthermore, IOS was in liquidation in Canada, presumably for the benefit of cred-
itors and shareholders. 519 F.2d at 978. This indicates that alternate procedures were
available and that certain claimants might desire to control their own actions. See CLAss
AcrIONS, supra, §§ 2.63-.64, 7.11.
The desirability of consolilating the litigation in one forum also becomes an issue when
concurrent forums are available and is a matter for the court's discretion. Id. § 11.16. The
court must consider questions of convenience, the connection of its own forum to the
underlying controversy, and, in the international context, whether its views of the merits
should prevail. Von Mehren & Trautmann, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and
a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1601, 1603-04 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Recog-
nition].
78 519 F.2d at 986.
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has been observed in an article relied upon by the Second Circuit
in Bersch,79 "[o]ne universal requirement for recognition of a
judgment [by a foreign tribunal] is that the rendering court have
had adjudicatory jurisdiction. '" 80 The uncontested affidavits of the
Bersch defendants indicated the "near certainty" 81 that foreign
courts would refuse to recognize a judgment purporting to bind
foreign plaintiffs whose only connection with the forum was their
purchase of stock in a multicontinental offering which involved
preparatory activities in the United States and a few American
purchasers. 82 Indeed, the class action notice procedure utilized in
Bersch, which requires a plaintiff to affirmatively opt out if he
desires to avoid adjudication of his claim by an American tri-
bunal, 83 might be found to be particularly objectionable in this
regard.84
The Second Circuit's holding that foreign investors do not
come within the scheme of congressional securities protection un-
less they can show that a defendant's domestic conduct was the
direct cause of their losses seems to be a pragmatic conclusion. The
mere fact that some American investors are adversely affected by a
multinational stock fraud should not lay a jurisdictional foundation
for foreigners so affected where the volume of American investors
is insignificant as compared to the total number of investors. In
light of the dearth of actual legislative consideration the Second
Circuit relied upon its own "best judgment as to what Congress
would have wished if these problems had occurred to it,"85 but
7 Recognition, supra note 77, cited in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 997
(2d Cir. 1975).8 Recognition, supra note 77, at 1610.
81 519 F.2d at 996.
82 Id. at 996-97. Several other recognition problems may have a bearing on a case like
Bersch. For example, bases for jurisdiction may differ among countries and courts may be
faced with whether they will recognize a foreign judgment in which the jurisdictional basis
asserted by the rendering court would not have been adequate for the recognizing court to
have taken original jurisdiction. Recognition, supra note 77, at 1614. Findings ofjurisdictional
facts are generally reviewable in international practice, id. at 1624-29, and nonappearing
parties in multiparty litigation may contest the appropriateness of basing jurisdiction on such
factual findings even if they are upheld by the recognizing court. Id. at 1635. Choice of law
problems may also present obstacles to recognition, particularly in civil law countries which
stress the relationship of the forum to the underlying transaction as a basis for jurisdiction.
Hypothetically, if a civil law court perceives that it had a stronger relationship with the
controversy than did the rendering forum, and thus desires its policies to prevail, it might
refuse to recognize the judgment. Id. at 1637.
83 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
84 The Bersch defendants' affidavits indicated that foreign courts might be more recep-
tive to a judgment based upon an opt-in form of notice. 519 F.2d at 997 n.48. Such a
procedure might assure greater fairness - a basic prerequisite for foreign recognition - in
the court's decision to extend jurisdiction. Recognition, supra note 77, at 1610.
8 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
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acknowledged that reasonable men might disagree with its in-
terpretation. Designed to remove from the shoulders of the United
States courts the burden of policing substantially foreign invest-
ment transactions, the direct causation test may indicate that dip-
lomatic agreements will be necessary to protect the international
investor from securities fraud.8 6
Nevertheless, it is submitted that, faced with the prospect of
freeing a guilty party, the Second Circuit should reexamine the
direct causation test in the case of a complex scheme to defraud
pursuant to which many constituent elements of the transaction
coalesce to cause plaintiffs' injury. In liT, this was not necessary
since the fraudulent diversion of assets occurred within the United
States. In Bersch, severe doubts concerning jurisdiction over absent
foreign class plaintiffs militated against such a broad interpreta-
tion. Nonetheless, the principle of preventing fraudulent schemes
from being exported from our shores is firmly rooted in case law87
and falls within a rational interpretation of legislative intent. Hope-
fully, the courts will not permit the obstruction of such an admira-
ble goal by conservative application of causation principles.
Charles Ferris
81 There appears to be a trend toward increased regulation of securities in Europe,
although in most cases such regulation is directed towards prescribing higher standards of
conduct for securities dealers. See American Adjudication, supra note 1, at 565-66 & n.82.
87 SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); Wandschneider v.
Industrial Incomes, Inc., of North America, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 93,422 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987
(S.D. Fla. 1963).
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